THE POWER OF UNLIKELY COALITIONS
Thomas J. Sugruet
Civil rights organizations, community groups, and the union
movement are all at a critical historical juncture. Besieged by the
transformations of global capitalism and beset by a conservative
repudiation of welfare, racial equality, and economic regulation, it is time
to rethink the strategies for both grassroots community and shopfloor union
organizing.! In many parts of the country, the relationship between unions
and community organizations ranges from inattentiveness to outright
suspicion and distrust. Many activists and their academic counterparts
have drawn a sharp line between the politics of community and the politics
of class or of the workplace. The case studies of New Haven, Connecticut
and Greensboro, North Carolina illustrate the great promise of forging
sustainable and viable relationships between unions and community
activists. The key lesson from these case studies is the need to transcend
conventional boundaries between community and union, class and race,
and political economy and identity. To borrow a phrase from historian
David Hollinger, the task at hand is to "wide[n] the circle of the we," in
order to find common ground where we can begin working together.2
The starting point for the creation of unlikely coalitions is the
recognition that workplaces and communities have both been devastated by
fundamental economic restructuring. For the past half century, unions have
struggled with the multiple impacts of deindustrialization, the rise of
service sector employment, and the emergence of a part-time, contingent
labor force. Traditional union structures since the postwar union-corporate3
settlement have greatly hindered creative responses to these changes.
t Bicentennial Class of 1940 Professor of History and Sociology, University of
Pennsylvania.
1. This rethinking is currently represented in a number of important collections of
essays. See, e.g., A NEw LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE NEw CENTURY (Gregory Mantsios ed.,
1998); AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY (Steven Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman eds., 1997); see also
NEw LAB. F. (Labor Resource Ctr., Queens College, City Univ. of N.Y.) and AHoRA Now!
(Labor/Community Strategy Ctr., Los Angeles, Cal.) (rethinking the links between
community, civil rights, and unionism).
2. David A. Hollinger, How Wide the Circleof the "We"? American Intellectualsand
the Problem of the Ethnos Since World War II, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 317 (1993).

3. The literature on this topic is vast. For an introduction, see Nelson Lichtenstein,
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With the exception of the public sector, organized labor has steadily lost
membership and political clout since the early 1950s. The same forces
have had corrosive effects on urban communities, particularly on
communities of color. Major American cities, which are disproportionately
home to the nation's African-American and Hispanic populations, have
battled against the combined and interactive effects of de-industrialization,
persistent workplace discrimination, political marginalization, urban
disinvestment, and public policies that favor suburban growth. 4 These
problems are fundamentally intertwined in the daily lives and experiences
of working people, despite the insistence of some academics and activists
that questions of race and class are analytically distinct. Both the trade
union movement and the grassroots community activists need to recognize
that racial inequality is fundamentally a matter of political economy and
that economic security in the workplace depends on eliminating persistent
racial and gender discrimination.
The struggles of community groups and unions are so difficult
because capital is relentlessly mobile.
Capital is translocal and
transnational and therefore seldom respects the integrity of either
workplace or community.5 The most successful social movements in
American history have started with a strong local base--on the shop floors
and in the neighborhoods. These movements, however, have seldom
succeeded when they have maintained a local focus. Coalitions between
unions and community groups must build on local strength but must also
think big. They must broaden their notion of community by reconciling
what are often perceived as mutually antagonistic interests.
This reconciliation requires rethinking our institutions. Community
organizations and unions alike must retool if they want to challenge
effectively the public policies and economic powers that are reshaping their
world. Community organizations must look beyond their neighborhood
boundaries-beyond the immediate crises that are usually the basis of
community organizing and activism. They risk becoming marginalized
unless they create translocal, transregional, and even transnational
networks. Left to their own devices, local organizations have the will but
ultimately not the capacity to address the overwhelming array of social,
political, and economic problems besieging their communities. Likewise,
unions must look beyond the workplace to grapple with the public politics

American Trade Unions and the "LaborQuestion": Past and Present, in WHAT'S NEXT FOR
ORGANIZED LABOR: THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE

OF UNIONS (1999).
4. See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND
INEQUALITY INPOSTWAR DETROIT (1996).
5. For an excellent discussion of these processes, see JEFFERSON COWIE, CAPITAL
MOVES: RCA'S SEVENTY-YEAR QUEST FOR CHEAP LABOR (1999).
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that devastate communities and put hard-won shop floor struggles at risk.
Throughout the country, imaginative campaigns have emerged from
unlikely coalitions between organized labor and community organizations.
Many of these alliances are fragile and difficult to sustain. Building
bridges between organizations with separate agendas, constituencies, and
institutional histories is difficult, but much can be learned by looking to
experiments around the country. In Baltimore, BUILD (Baltimoreans
United in Leadership Development) and its offshoot, the SSC (Solidarity
Sponsoring Committee) have forged a community-labor coalition to push
for a living wage for local service sector workers. "[A] little bit of church,
a little bit of union, a little bit of social service and a whole lot of politics,"
as one organizer describes it, the Baltimore campaign has created a cadre of
savvy grassroots leaders who have strengthened both unions and
community organizations.6
Other union-community coalitions have challenged anti-worker and
anti-community public policies in an era of conservative retrenchment.7 In
Los Angeles, for example, the Janitors for Justice union organizing drive
has worked closely with advocates of public transportation reform. This
alliance developed because so many low wage service workers are
dependent on the city's ill-run bus system.s In New York, unions and
community groups have formed a more tentative effort to challenge
"welfare reform" that is devastating poor communities of color and
expanding the ranks of the working poor. 9 In California, Florida, and
elsewhere, unions and immigrant rights organizations are forging a
powerful progressive alliance to organize supposedly "unorganizable" new
Asian and Latino immigrants and to challenge laws that deny new
immigrants access to education and other social services.10
There are three additional case studies that illuminate the process of
coalition building and provide examples, analogies, or inspiration for local
community activists. The common ground in each of these case studies is
6. Janice Fine, Moving Innovationfrom the Margins to the Center, in A NEw
1, at 139, 152.

LABOR

MOVEMENT FOR THE NEw CENTURY, supra note

7. In recent years, public pressure has mounted for welfare reform and other policies
which have negative effects on the working poor and other less fortunate members of
society.
8. See Robin D. G. Kelley, The New Urban Working Class and Organized Labor,
NEW LAB. F., Fall 1997, at 7.
9. See generally Bill Fletcher, Jr., Seizing the Time Because the Time is Now: Welfare
Repeal and LaborReconstruction, in AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 119, 11931; Frances Fox Piven, The New Reserve Army of Labor, in AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY, supra
note 1, at 106. For a somewhat skeptical view of union-community efforts to challenge
workfare in New York, see David Glenn, Surplus Meaning in Brooklyn, DIssENT, Winter
1998, at I10.
10. See generally Mae M. Ngai, Who is an American Worker? Asian Immigrants, Race,
and the NationalBoundariesof Class, in AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 173.
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the unlikelihood of coalition. First, in the 1940s and 1950s, the United
Packinghouse Workers of America ("UPWA") overcame formidable racial
and geographic divisions. Although black and white meatpackers lived in
separate worlds, it did not prevent them from fighting together against
employers who sought to exploit regional and racial divisions to deflate
wages, divide workers, and discourage union organization. Second, the
Massachusetts building trades unions long had a hostile relationship with
women and communities of color. Yet, in the crucible of a statewide antiunion referendum campaign in 1988, construction unions allied with
African-American and Hispanic organizations on issues of racial equality
in the workplace. Finally, in the 1990s, a Philadelphia organization of
tradeswomen dedicated to breaking down gender barriers in the skilled
trades responded to the crisis that many poor women faced in the aftermath
of welfare reform by initiating a training program for women seeking
employment in the construction industry and related trades.
I.

THE UPWA

One of the most imaginative trade unions of the twentieth century, the
UPWA offered an alternative to the racial gradualism and organizational
stagnation of many unions in the post-World War II years.' The UPWA
faced real obstacles in its effort to organize workers. Employers did their
best to use racial animosity as a tool to divide workers in multi-racial
meatpacking plants. Their task was aided by the nearly complete
separation of black and white packinghouse workers outside of the
workplace-black and white workers seldom interacted in any meaningful
way in their communities.
They lived in separate and unequal
neighborhoods, did not interact socially, and did not attend the same
churches or schools. White UPWA workers fiercely protected their allwhite enclaves; a majority was deeply, instinctively anti-black.
However, the UPWA gave black and white workers a sense that their
interests were common. As labor historian Roger Horowitz writes, "the
UPWA countered group identification based on racial superiority by
promoting and demonstrating the material benefits of collective action
based on class interests.' 2 UPWA organizers did not assume, as many
civil rights activists in the Cold War era did, that moral suasion and
11. My account draws from the rich body of scholarship on the UPWA. See DEBORAH
FINK, CUTrING INTO THE MEATPACKING LINE: WORKERS AND CHANGE IN THE RURAL

MIDWEST (1998); RICK HALPERN, DOWN ON THE KILLING FLOOR: BLACK AND WHITE
WORKERS IN CHICAGO'S PACKINGHOUSES, 1904-54 (1997); ROGER HOROWITZ, NEGRO AND
WHITE, UNITE AND FIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM IN MEATPACKING,
1930-1990 (1997); UNIONIZING THE JUNGLES: LABOR AND COMMUNITY IN THE TWENTIETHCENTURY MEATPACKING INDUSTRY (Shelton & Stromquist et al. eds., 1997).
12. HOROWrrz, supra note 11, at 4.
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conversion could change the hearts and minds of racist workers. Their
tactic was simple and brilliant. They worked to change the institutionsthat
perpetuated racial inequality. The UPWA organizers recognized that
racism was not solely a consequence of individual attitudes and beliefs, but
was built into the very structure of key social organizations. Attentive to
the "dynamic interplay of race and class," UPWA activists fashioned a
strategy that addressed both issues simultaneously. 3
The second element of the UPWA's success was that it built on a
strong base of grassroots organization but did not stop there. Community
organization was a means, not an end. By creating what the UPWA
activists called "chains," informal translocal networks of local unions that
shared information and collaborated in the organization of new workers,
the UPWA as a whole was able to respond to the mobility of capital in
ways that local unions, alone, could not. 14 The UPWA pursued another
translocal strategy that proved quite effective. It persuaded workers in
predominantly white communities like Waterloo, Iowa; Austin, Minnesota;
and Chicago, Illinois that they had interests in common with black workers
in communities like Fort Worth, Texas; Memphis, Tennessee; and
Shreveport, Louisiana.
The UPWA activists built a coalition on civil rights that transcended
racial, regional, and cultural differences. They built this coalition by
emphasizing the fact that the existence of an underpaid and predominantly
minority workforce in the South directly affected the fate of all workers.
The UPWA activists thus created a community of common interest
between northern and southern workers, between workers in big and small
towns, and between black and white workers. The UPWA was one of the
few organizations in mid-twentieth century America that was truly racially
diverse.
II.

MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING TRADES UNDER SIEGE

A second case offers an example of the ways that civil rights
organizations and community groups influenced union policy. Through
coalition building, they forced union groups to reappraise their training,
apprenticeship, and affirmative action policies. In 1988, Question 2, a
statewide referendum to repeal the state's prevailing wage law, appeared on
the ballot in Massachusetts."' Massachusetts had been one of the first states
13. Id. at 4-5.
14. See id. at 209-13 (describing union chains).
15. See MARK ERLICH, LABOR AT THE BALLOT Box: THE MASSACHUSETTS PREVAILING
WAGE CAMPAIGN OF 1988 (1990) (discussing the efforts to preserve the prevailing wage law
in Massachusetts in 1988). It should be noted for the sake of full disclosure that I was a
political organizer for Painters District Council 35 in Eastern Massachusetts for the
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to pass a prevailing wage law. Since 1935, the state required that all
workers on government contracts be paid the area's prevailing union
wage. 16 The Question 2 campaign was coordinated and well-funded by a
national anti-union construction industry lobbying group, the Associated
Builders and Contractors ("ABC"), and Citizens for Limited Taxation, a
Massachusetts group that had won two statewide anti-property tax
referenda campaigns in the 1980s.
The primary beneficiaries of the prevailing wage law were the state's
building trades unions. Long infamous as bastions of white male privilege,
the building trades had been the special targets of civil rights protest and of
government-mandated affirmative action. Many building trades unions had
been insular, drawing their members from neighborhood, ethnic, and
kinship networks. All-white construction crews were not uncommon, even
at work sites in cities with large minority populations. The building trades
unions were also known to be hostile to the hiring and advancement of
women workers. 7
Alone, the building trades unions could not mount a successful
campaign against Question 2. They needed to form a broad-based electoral
coalition to have a chance of victory against the seemingly populist, antitax campaign led by the opponents of the prevailing wage. This meant that
the building trades unions needed to reach out to groups whom they had
traditionally excluded. But what could persuade minority voters, women,
and community activists to join the campaign? Black church and
community leaders were particularly skeptical of the building trades' long
history as a bastion of white privilege. When construction unionists
approached the Massachusetts Black Legislative Caucus with hopes of
enlisting the support of prominent black activists, including the Reverend
Jesse L. Jackson, they were met with distrust.
African-American and Hispanic groups used the opportunity to
pressure building trades unions to expand their outreach programs and to
admit more minorities to apprenticeship programs.
They withheld
endorsement of the campaign opposing Question 2 until the building trades
unions agreed to increase the representation of minority workers on
worksites.
This demand had particular significance since the
Massachusetts economy was booming at that time and since the state was
about to begin a massive reconstruction of Boston's expressway system. A
Question 2 campaign. What follows draws on both Erlich's account and on my recollections
of the campaign.
16. See id. at 18-19. Massachusetts passed its prevailing wage law in 1914 and
amended the law to link the prevailing wage to collectively bargained wage agreements in
1935.

17. For a brief discussion of the discrimination and affirmative action in the building
trades, see Thomas J. Sugrue, The Tangled Roots of Affirmative Action, 41 AM. BEHAv. Sci.
886 (1998).
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"working partnership" between the building trades and black leaders was
hammered out during often-tense negotiations in the summer and fall.
While the building trades-minority leadership alliance had some critics who
wanted the alliance to go further, it did succeed in creating a working
coalition between groups that had a long history of mutual antagonism.' 8
By November 1988, metropolitan Boston was awash in "Vote No on
Question 2" posters and lawn signs. Union-funded "get-out-the-vote"
efforts led to high turnouts in working-class wards, both white and nonwhite. The conservative opponents of the prevailing wage law were
disappointed because the referendum lost decisively, and by extremely
large margins among black, Hispanic, and women voters. Equally as
important, the campaign brought minority groups and predominantly white
union members together for the first time and forced a frank discussion
about achieving racial equality in the construction industry.
III. TRADESWOMEN: FROM AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO WELFARE REFORM

Unlikely coalitions often form in response to immediate crises such as
the Question 2 campaign in Massachusetts. However, coalitions may also
result from the creativity of community and union leaders involved in long-

term struggles for economic and social justice. In Philadelphia, a group of
tradeswomen played a crucial role in expanding traditional unionism by
reaching out to non-union workers and addressing issues seldom

considered within the purview of union organizations. Tradeswomen of
Purpose/Women in Non-Traditional Jobs ("TOP/WIN") emerged in the late
1970s to promote solidarity among women entering "non-traditional
occupations," occupied predominantly by men.' 9 After the passage of the
Job Training Partnership Act in 1987, TOP/WIN further advanced its

purpose by creating a training program for women seeking employment in
the construction industry and related trades. It also drew funds from unions
and employer groups that were obliged to comply with affirmative action
orders.
TOP/WIN transformed itself again in the aftermath of the bipartisan
legislation that abolished Aid to Families with Dependent Children in 1996.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of
199620 put time limits and other strictures on the receipt of welfare and
required welfare recipients to either work or participate in job training
programs. Maintaining its role in increasing the representation of women
in the skilled trades, TOP/WIN turned its energies toward helping women
18. See ERLICH, supra note 15, at 105-20.
19. See Breaking Barriersthe Hard Way, PHILA. DAILY NEWS,May 20, 1993.
20. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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who had been forced off welfare. Its three-part training program includes:
basic literacy and mathematics; training in the "hard skills" of electrical
work, plumbing, carpentry, and machine operation; and training in "soft
skills," particularly dealing with gender issues in predominantly male
workplaces.2
Advocates for the poor in Pennsylvania have been particularly critical
of the draconian requirement that welfare recipients work a minimum of
twenty hours per week after two years on welfare. In major postindustrial
cities such as Philadelphia, where unemployment rates remain above the
national average, employers are reluctant to hire former welfare recipients
and even part-time jobs are difficult to find.22 As community criticism of
welfare reform mounted, TOP/WIN grappled with Pennsylvania state
welfare regulations requiring all welfare recipients to work at least twenty
hours per week after two years. Because Pennsylvania is one of the small
number of states that does not allow education or job training to count
toward the work requirement, TOP/WIN has helped trainees meet their
work requirement by purchasing shell houses in South Philadelphia and
paying trainees to renovate them.3 The renovated houses will both
improve the housing stock in impoverished communities and will be
offered for sale to graduates of TOP/WIN's training program. TOP/WIN
also places nearly all of its graduates into unionized employment in skilled
trades.
What makes the TOP/WIN program so ingenious is that it responds to
the interests of several groups simultaneously. First, it assists women,
particularly women of color, who want to work in the remunerative but
male-dominated skilled trades.
Second, it meets the demands of
community groups for job training programs that lead to jobs. Third, it
helps revitalize the physical fabric of Philadelphia's impoverished inner
city communities. Finally, it provides a creative alternative to the makework schemes and low paying jobs that entrap many former welfare
recipients in a life of working poverty.24
The postwar UPWA, the building trades' prevailing wage campaign,
and TOP/WIN are all examples of the redefinition of group interest and
21. For information on the last ten years of TOP/WIN efforts, see Remarks of Linda
Butler, Executive Director TOP/WIN, in WELFARE REFORM AND SELF SUFFICIENCY:
STRATEGIES FOR '99 AND BEYOND, SUMMARY REPORT OF 1999 COMMON GROUND
CONFERENCE, 1999, at pp. 8-9.
22. See generally KATHERINE NEWMAN, No SHAME IN MY GAME (1999).
On
Philadelphia specifically, see JANET E. RAFFEL, THE 21ST CENTURY LEAGUE, TANF, ACT
35, AND PENNSYLvANIA'S NEW WELFARE SYSTEM: A REvIEw OF THE FIRST YEAR OF
IMPLEMENTATION IN GREATER PHILADELPHIA (Bill Hangley, Jr. ed., 1998).
23. See Butler, supra note 21. On earlier efforts, see Rehabbing Homes, Careers:PHA
Tenants Learn ConstructionSkills, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 31, 1993.
24. On the working poor generally, see NEWMAN, supra note 22.
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social justice that challenges public policies that are detrimental to working
people and their communities. These are three small examples of how
unlikely coalition building can push beyond the parochialism of trade
unions and community organizations. These examples help us answer
three important questions. First, can unions overcome the racial divisions
that are deeply entrenched in working class communities? The UPWA
offers one example of unions overcoming racial animosity by highlighting
class interests that bind black and white workers together. Second, can
often-conservative organizations that have long protected the privileges of
race and gender build bridges with groups committed to racial and gender
equality? The Massachusetts Question 2 campaign reminds us that
coalition building is sometimes accomplished by coercion rather than
cooperation, but that even coercion can yield gains for all parties involved.
Third, how can unions and community groups work together to challenge
pernicious public policies like welfare reform? Philadelphia's TOP/WIN
program has diversified skilled trades unions, provided essential job
training for underemployed women, embarked on community economic
development, created new jobs, and reshaped social policy in the wake of
welfare repeal.
Each of these efforts faced formidable odds. Each brought to the table
folks who had seldom met, considered their interests common, or
collaborated in a common struggle. These unlikely coalitions offer
powerful lessons to those of us who want to bring unions and civil rights
groups together. Imagination, coercion, and collaboration are all necessary
to challenge those corporate policies that sacrifice the needs of working
people and their communities for stockholder profits. They are necessary
to reshape public policies, from labor law to welfare, that undermine the
quality of life of many working Americans.

